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Article
Incorporating a "Best Interests of the Child"
Approach Into Immigration Law and
Procedure
Bridgette A. Carr
United States immigration law and procedure frequently ignore the plight
of children directly affected by immigration proceedings. This ignorance
means decision-makers often lack the discretion to protect a child from
persecution by halting the deportation of a parent, while parents must
choose between abandoning their children in a foreign land and risking
the torture of their children. United States immigration law
systematically fails to consider the best interests of children directly
affected by immigration proceedings. This failure has resulted in a split
among the federal circuit courts of appeals regarding whether the
persecution a child faces may be used to halt the deportation of a parent.
The omission of a "best interests of the child" approach in immigration
law and procedure for children who are accompanied by a parent fails to
protect foreign national and United States citizen children. Models for
eliminating these protection failures can be found in United States child
welfare law and procedure, international law, and the immigration law of
other nations, such as Canada. Building from these models, the United
States must implement and give substantial weight to the best interests of
directly affected children in its immigration law and procedure.
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INTRODUCTION
Esther Olowo is a native and citizen of Nigeria, and the mother of
minor twin daughters who are legal permanent residents of the United
States.' When Esther was twelve years old, she was subjected to female
genital mutilation.2 During her removal proceedings, Esther told the
immigration judge that she feared for the safety of her daughters.3 Esther
knew that, if the judge ordered her deported, her daughters would have to
accompany her because her husband could not care for them on his own.4
To protect her daughters from the horrors of female genital mutilation,
Esther applied for asylum. 5  At the asylum hearing, Esther told the
immigration judge that she would be powerless to prevent her daughters
from being subjected to female genital mutilation if she were deported. 6
The immigration judge denied Esther's claim on the basis that Esther
had already been a victim of female genital mutilation and therefore did
not have a well-founded fear of persecution. The immigration judge could
not consider Esther's fear for her children because her children had the
legal right to stay in the United States. 7 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
concurred with the immigration judge, but the Seventh Circuit did not stop
there. Recognizing the danger to Esther's children, who were legally
entitled to remain safely in the United States, the court made the
unprecedented move of ordering that Esther be reported to state child
welfare authorities to protect Esther's children from female genital
mutilation.8
The Olowo case is a poignant example of the reality facing many
families and children ensnared in the United States immigration system.
Children like Esther's are often directly affected 9 by immigration law and
1. Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 695-98 (7th Cir. 2004).
2. Id. at 698.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 697 (noting that Olowo applied for asylum on the ground that "she and her twin
daughters are members of a social group that is subjected to female genital mutilation in
Nigeria, and that she fears that they will undergo this procedure if they return there with
her.").
6. Id. at 698.
7. Id. at 700.
8. Id. at 703:
We also direct the Clerk of this court to send a copy of this opinion to the
appropriate office of the Illinois department of Children and Family
Services... and the Illinois State's Attorney for Cook County, whose duty
it is to represent the people of the State of Illinois in proceedings under
the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 .. .which protects minors from parents
who allow acts of torture to be committed on minors.
(internal citations omitted).
9. For purposes of this Article, the phrase "directly affected child" refers to any child
directly affected by an immigration decision. This could mean either a child born in the
United States or a foreign-born child. In addition, the relationship between the individual and
the directly affected child need not be a parent-child relationship, but may be any relationship
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procedure, yet have no voice and no access to the immigration system
because of the failure of immigration law and procedure to consider their
interests.'0 This lack of access, combined with gaps in protection," makes
accompanied children 12 who are directly affected by immigration decisions
extremely vulnerable. Accompanied children may be members of families
where all members of the family have the same status or they may be
members of mixed-status families.13 In contrast with unaccompanied 4 or
that is affected by the immigration decision, such as that between a grandparent and
grandchild, where the grandparent is the primary caregiver for the child. The phrase
"directly affected child" can be found in Canadian immigration law, which defines a "directly
affected child" as
a Canadian or foreign-born child (and could include children outside of
Canada). The relationship between the applicant [for immigration relief]
and "any child directly affected" need not necessarily be that of parent
and child, but could be another relationship that is affected by the
decision. For example, a grandparent could be the primary caregiver
who is affected by the immigration decision, and the decision may thus
affect the child.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CAN., IMMIGRANT APPLICATIONS IN CANADA MADE ON
HUMANITARIAN OR COMPASSIONATE GROUNDS, IP 5 at 15 (2008).
10. See David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children's Rights
Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 980 (2002) ("[Llife-altering determinations in
immigration matters routinely are reached without consideration of the voices and viewpoints
of children who are directly involved."). In fact, in United States immigration law,
"child" is a term of art limited to "an unmarried person under twenty-one
years of age" who falls into one of six categories. To qualify in any of
these categories requires a particular relationship with a parent, such as
birth in wedlock, creation of a stepchild relationship, "legitimation," or
adoption. Immigration law never employs the term "child" except in
relationship to a parent, and, therefore, does not conceive of a "child"
existing outside this relationship.
Id. at 991.
11. David Thronson, Custody and Contradictions: Exploring Immigration Law as Federal
Family Law in the Context of Child Custody, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 453, 477 (2008):
The related and sometimes interwoven laws of immigration and
nationality exhibit a striking lack of consistency in the treatment of
children .... What emerges is not a thoughtful and reasoned pattern but
rather a haphazard scheme, occasionally to the random benefit of
children yet often capriciously harmful.
12. For purposes of this Article, the phrase "accompanied child" refers to a child in the
care of a parent.
13. A "mixed-status family" is one in which family members do not all share a single
citizenship or immigration status. In 2005 there were 6.6 million families in which the head of
the family or the spouse was unauthorized, and 3.1 million children in these families were
United States citizens. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, THE SIZE AND
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S., at ii (2006),
available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf.
14. The phrase "unaccompanied child" is often defined as "any person under the age of
eighteen who is separated from both parents and is not being cared for by an adult who, by
law or custom, has a responsibility to do so, and who is an asylum seeker, recognized refugee
or other externally displaced person." Linda Piwowarczyk, Our Responsibility to
Unaccompanied and Separated Children in the United States: A Helping Hand, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
263, 264 (2006) (quoting Andre Sourander, Behavior Problems and Traumatic Events of
Unaccompanied Refugee Minors, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 719 (1998)). This definition will be
used for purposes of this Article.
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separated 15 children, accompanied children face a bigger risk of being
invisible in the United States immigration system and face the additional
risk of having conflicting interests16 with their parents. 17 The potential
issues facing accompanied children vary based on their own citizenship
and whether they have the same interests as their parents.18
Under current United States immigration law, accompanied children
who are directly affected by immigration proceedings have no opportunity
for their best interests to be considered.19 The failure of immigration law
and procedure to incorporate a "best interests of the child" approach
ignores a successful means of protecting children that is common both
internationally and domestically. 20 This Article argues for statutory reform
15. In addition to the term "unaccompanied child," the term "separated child" is often
used. A separated child is one who is accompanied by an adult, but is not with a parent, legal
guardian, or customary caretaker, but perhaps with a trafficker, sibling, or acquaintance.
Jacqueline Bhabha, Seeking Asylum Alone: Treatment of Separated and Trafficked Children in Need
of Refugee Protection, 42 INT'L MIGRATION 141, 147 n.2 (2004).
16. 1 have used the word "interests" to describe the child's own view of his or her plight if
removed. I am not, even with my use of examples, infra Part II, stating that all children will
feel one way about a certain set of facts. My examples are purely for illustrative purposes to
highlight the potential problems that might arise.
17. In focusing on accompanied children, this Article does not intend to minimize the
unique vulnerabilities or plight of separated or unaccompanied children. However, the issues
facing separated and unaccompanied children have been written about extensively.
Consistent with this Article, scholarship on the plight of separated and unaccompanied
children includes a call for a "best interest of the child" standard to be applied in cases
involving such children. See Jacqueline Bhabha, "Not a Sack of Potatoes": Moving and Removing
Children Across Borders, 15 B.U. PUB. INT'L L.J. 197, 205 (2006); Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy
Young, Not Adults in Miniature: Unaccompanied Child Asylum Seekers and the New U.S.
Guidelines, 11 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 84, 95-98 (1999); Christopher Nugent, Whose Children Are
These? Towards Ensuring the Best Interests and Empowerment of Unaccompanied Alien Children, 15
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219, 219-21 (2006). Though the unique issues facing separated and
unaccompanied children are beyond the scope of this Article, the changes advocated in this
Article are intended to extend to all children directly affected by immigration law and policy,
including separated and unaccompanied children.
18. Another issue for accompanied children is the fact that individuals in removal
proceedings are not entitled to a free, court-appointed attorney. See Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006). This means that often the directly
affected children will be involved in proceedings in which their parents are representing
themselves pro se. This lack of representation increases the possibility that a child's plight
will go unnoticed by the decision-maker. From 1994 through 2005, 17% of asylum cases were
heard without an attorney representing the applicant. Those cases resulted in significantly
more denials than cases with an attorney present (93.4% compared with 64.0%). Transactional
Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Immigration Judges tblI.1 (2006),
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160.
19. Some may wonder how the deportation context is any different from a criminal
proceeding in which a child's parent may be imprisoned. The true analogy to a criminal
proceeding would be one in which sentencing the parent to prison would mean the parent
may take the child to prison with him or her. The reality that a parent may force a child to
"voluntarily depart" the United States means that the parent's removal is an action concerning
a child. To ignore this reality is to potentially put United States citizen and legal permanent
resident children at risk of great harm. One needs to look no further than the Olowo case to
see the possibility of persecution happening to legal permanent resident children as a result of
their mother's removal. See Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 695-98 (7th Cir. 2004).
20. The phrase the "best interests of the child" is used in both international law and
domestic law. See infra Part I. Despite its prevalence as a standard, there is no agreed-upon
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incorporating a "best interests of the child" approach into immigration law
and procedure. A "best interests of the child" determination is necessary
to protect children like Esther's and, more importantly, to protect children
whose parents fail to object to the harm they would face if they were
ordered removed. Many children in danger of persecution have no one to
speak for them.
Part I examines both domestic and international use and reliance on
the "best interests of the child" approach as one way to provide effective
protection to children. Part II uses hypothetical examples to describe the
gaps in protection for children directly affected by immigration
proceedings in the United States. Part III explores the current use of a
"best interests of the child" standard in domestic immigration law. This
Part also identifies a split among the federal circuits created by the varied
approaches to incorporating the interests of children. Part IV highlights
the use of the "best interests of the child" approach in Canadian
immigration law. Part V discusses the changes that would be required to
incorporate a "best interests of the child" approach into the substance and
procedure of United States immigration law. Finally, this Article concludes
with a call for reform of immigration law and procedure in order to
effectively protect all children directly affected by immigration
proceedings.
I. THE PREVALENCE OF THE "BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD" APPROACH IN
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
In both domestic and international law, a common legal standard for
cases involving children is the "best interests of the child" standard.21 The
United States immigration system runs counter to this prevailing norm.
Most United States immigration proceedings include no determination
regarding the best interests of the child,22 although such proceedings
definition for the "best interests of the child." In fact, "there is now widespread appreciation
that the child's best interests are a policy goal and not an administrable legal standard."
Katherine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the Context of the ALl Principles of the Law
of Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 5, 15-16 (2002). For the purposes of this Article,
the "best interests of the child" approach refers to both a process that is child-centered and
allows the voice of a child to be heard and a substantive legal standard that considers the
"safety, permanency, and well-being of the child" in immigration proceedings. See AMY
THOMPSON, CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY PRIORITIES, A CHILD ALONE AND WITHOUT PAPERS 16
(2008) (noting that "U.S. child welfare standards for the best interest of the child are defined in
federal law as prioritizing the safety, permanency, and well-being of the child in all
proceedings involving children" and arguing for an adoption of such a standard for
unaccompanied children in return and repatriation processes).
21. See D. Marriane Blair & Merle Hope Weiner, Resolving Parental Custody Disputes - A
Comparative Exploration, 39 FAMILY L.Q. 247, 247 (2005).
22. Thronson, supra note 10, at 980 ("Broader debates about children's rights have largely
bypassed immigration law and efforts to develop workable, child-centered approaches in
immigration law have gained little footing. Immigration law and decisions continue to reflect
conceptions of children that limit their recognition as persons and silence their voices.").
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J. [Vol. 12
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frequently result in decisions that directly affect the placement of
children.23  This failure to analyze the best interests of the child in
immigration proceedings results in a failure to protect many children
caught up in the United States immigration system. Addressing these
issues will require changes in both immigration procedure and substantive
law, since both currently devalue "children's interests and their roles in
families." 24 Certain areas of United States domestic law, such as child
welfare, have a history of focusing on the best interests of the child 25 and
should serve as a guide for the treatment of children in immigration
proceedings.
A. The "Best Interests" Approach in Domestic Law Outside of the
Immigration Context
The "best interests of the child" approach has a long history in
domestic law outside of the immigration context. The law and procedure
of child custody and of child abuse and neglect reflect the importance of
considering the directly affected child's best interests.26
In the United States, the child custody law in every state "embraces the
'best interests' standard." 27 The emergence of a "best interests of the child"
approach in the United States occurred during the period from 1790 to
1890.28 In the context of child abuse and neglect, states have been required
since the early 1970s to provide guardians ad litem for all children in child
abuse and neglect proceedings. 29 The role of the guardian ad litem was not
23. See Thronson, supra note 11, at 454 ("[W]ithout analysis or rationale, federal decisions
enforcing immigration law routinely function as child custody determinations.").
24. Thronson, supra note 11, at 480.
25. See Gary A. Debele, A Children's Rights Approach to Relocation: A Meaningful Best
Interests Standard, 15 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 75, 81 (1998).
26. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
235, 110 Stat. 3063 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(ix)(1)-(11) (2000 & Supp.
V 2005)).
27. Blair & Weiner, supra note 21, at 247 (citing IRA MARK ELLMAN, CHIEF REPORTER'S
FOREWORD TO PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, at xviii (American Law Institute 2002)); see also Report of the Working
Group on the Best Interests of the Child and the Role of the Attorney, 6 NEV. L. J. 682, 682 (2006)
[hereinafter Report of the Working Group] ("'[Blest interests' advocacy and best interests models
of representation frequent many jurisdictions and individual attorney practices when the
client is a child.").
28. Debele, supra note 25, at 81. This emergence coincided with "a dramatic shift away
from the father's common law rights to custody and control of their children toward a more
modern emphasis on the need to nurture, care for, and love of the child." Id.
29. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, §
4(B)(2)(G), 88 Stat. 4, 7 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119c (2000 & Supp. V
2005)). The guardian ad litem requirement was not given much thought during the bill's
passage:
[The guardian ad litem requirement] was not included in the original
version of the bill passed by the Senate. The issue was only addressed in
later committee hearings owing to the testimony of Brian Fraser, then a
staff attorney for the National Center for Prevention of Child Abuse and
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
defined until 1996, in an amendment to the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act providing that a guardian ad litem's role is to obtain "first-
hand a clear understanding of the situation and needs of the child; and to
make recommendations to the court concerning the best interests of the
child."30 Unlike a lawyer, who is retained by a client, a guardian ad litem is
an officer of the court who is bound to protect the child's interests, which
may not be the same as the child's expressed preferences.31
Just as guardians ad litem must protect a child's interests, lawyers who
represent children in child abuse and neglect cases must also address the
"best interests of the child" standard. The use of a "best interests of the
child" approach has been the focus of much debate within child advocacy
communities. 32 The American Bar Association has promulgated standards
for lawyers representing children in child abuse and neglect cases.33 These
standards include guidance regarding how a lawyer should determine a
child's interests.34
In light of the current scholarly debate, it is impossible to point to one
legal standard defining the "best interests of the child" approach in
domestic law. It is, however, possible to identify the priorities of the "best
Neglect at the University of Colorado. Fraser's testimony, which then
became the basis for a law review article, advocated that the guardian ad
litem be appointed as a special guardian legally obligated to do
everything within his power to ensure a just judgment that is in the
child's best interests, including acting as investigator, counsel, advocate,
and guardian.
JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND
PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 33 n.12 (2007) (citing Brian Fraser, Independent Representation for the
Abused and Neglected Child: The Guardian ad Litem, 13 CAL W.L. REV. 16, 29 (1976)).
30. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act Amendments of 1996, § 107(b)(2)(A)(ix)(l)
(emphasis added). This amendment also specified the guardian ad litem as "an attorney or a
court appointed special advocate (or both)." Id.
31. See ABA Standards for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, A-2
(1996) [hereinafter ABA Standards].
32. See Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of Best Interest in Client-Directed Lawyering for
Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505, 1524-63 (1996) (critiquing
four models of best interest lawyering and proposing a fifth model integrating components
from the original four); see also Recommendations of the Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1309 (1996) [hereinafter Recommendations
of the Conference] (finding that lawyers use too much discretion on behalf of child clients,
including in "best interests" determinations and, instead, a more appropriate focus for the
lawyer would be on the child's legal interests); Report of the Working Group, supra note 27, at
683. ("[T]he best interests per se is not an acceptable standard to define the scope, goals, or
duties of legal representation, but may be one among many factors taken into account during
representation.").
33. ABA Standards, supra note 31.
34. ABA Standards, supra note 31, at B-5:
The determination of the child's legal interests should be based on
objective criteria as set forth in the law that are related to the purposes of
the proceedings. The criteria should address the child-specific needs and
preferences, the goal of expeditious resolution of the case so the child can
remain or return home or be placed in a safe, nurturing, and permanent
environment, and the use of the least restrictive or detrimental
alternatives available.
[Vol. 12
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interests" approach. Procedurally, the "best interests" approach prioritizes
allowing the child to have a voice.35 Substantively, the "best interests"
approach prioritizes the child's safety, permanency, and well-being. 36 It is
these priorities - voice, safety, permanency, and well-being - that
immigration law and procedure must incorporate.
B. The "Best Interests" Approach in International Law: The
Convention on the Rights of the Child
In international law, one of the clearest statements regarding the "best
interests of the child" standard can be found in the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).37 The CRC, however, did not
originate the concept in international law; thirty years prior to the CRC, the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of the Child introduced the idea
that "the best interests of the child shall be the paramount consideration." 38
The ideals of the Declaration on the Rights of the Child were
formalized into obligations when the CRC was adopted in November
1989.39 The United States became a signatory to the CRC in 1995.40 One of
the fundamental principles of the CRC is the "best interests of the child"
standard. This standard is set forth in Article 3, which states, "In all actions
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,
the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. '" 41 The "best
interests of the child" standard in the international context has been called
an "umbrella provision" and is invoked often as a guiding principle of
interpretation for other articles and rights in the CRC.42
35. See Koh Peters, supra note 32, at 1566 (highlighting the need to begin with the "child in
her context" when determining the child's best interest); see also Recommendations of the
Conference, supra note 32 (recommending that, when a child has the capacity to direct
representation, the child must be allowed to set the goals of the representation in the same
manner as an adult client); Report of the Working Group, supra note 32, at 684 (finding that a
child's lawyer must ascertain and zealously advocate for the child's wishes); ABA Standards,
supra note 31, at 1-4.
36. See ABA Standards, supra note 31, at B-5.
37. Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989).
38. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), princ. 2, 14 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20,1959).
39. CRC, supra note 37, at pmbl.
40. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as
at 31 December 2006, at 328, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/25 (Vol. I)
(2007), available at http:/ / treaties.un.org/doc/source/ publications/MTDSG/ English-l.pdf
[hereinafter Multilateral Treaties Deposited]; Press Release, White House Statement on U.S.
Decision to Sign U.N. Convention on Rights of the Child (Feb. 10, 1995), available at
http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/archives/whitehouse-papers/1995/Feb/1995-02-10-us-to-sign-
un-convention-on-rights-of-child.text.
41. CRC, supra note 37, at art. 3(1) (emphasis added).
42. See, e.g., Jonathan Todres, Emerging Limitations on the Rights of the Child: The U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child and Its Early Case Law, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 159,
"Best Interests of the Child" and Immigration
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The CRC "is the most universally adopted of all human rights charters,
ratified by all but two countries in the world within the first ten years of its
existence." 43 In fact, coinciding with the principles of the CRC, "virtually
all nations are guided by the precept that the primary consideration
underlying any [child] custody decision must be the best interests of the
child." 44
As both domestic and international law have recognized, a "best
interests of the child" approach is essential in protecting children. When a
system like the United States immigration system fails to incorporate such
an approach, children affected by that system are at risk.
II. AT RISK AND OFTEN INVISIBLE: THE PLIGHT OF DIRECTLY AFFECTED
ACCOMPANIED CHILDREN IN DOMESTIC IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS
In the United States, a "best interests of the child" approach is not
available in the immigration system for children accompanied by a parent.
Accompanied children face various degrees of risk and invisibility
depending on whether their immigration status and interests are aligned
with those of their parents. In each of the four Sections below, the risk and
invisibility of the accompanied child is assessed based on whether the
child's status and interests align or conflict with those of the parent. 45
A. Accompanied Child in Same-Status Family with Aligned
Interests
Accompanied children often have the same status as their parents, 46
which means that neither the child nor the parent has permission to remain
in the United States. When an accompanied child has the same status and
interests as his or her parent, that child has the greatest likelihood of being
protected, especially when the parent advocates on behalf of the child.
Even when status and interests align, however, an accompanied child may
not be able to access effective protection if the parent fails to advocate on
behalf of the child.
171 (1998)..
43. Thronson, supra note 10, at 988 (citing Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Keynote Address at
the Symposium on Legal Reform and Children's Human Rights, 14 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
331, 333 (2000)). The United States and Somalia have signed but not ratified the CRC. See
Multilateral Treaties Deposited, supra note 40, at 328.
44. Blair & Weiner, supra note 21, at 247.
45. In order to provide consistency with the facts of the Olowo case and because of the
stark protection gaps it highlights, I have used female genital mutilation as the basis for the
scenarios in this Article.
46. As of March 2004, in families in which the head of the household was undocumented,
approximately one-third, or 1.6 million, of the children were also undocumented. JEFFREY S.
PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CENTER, UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANTS: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS,
BACKGROUND BRIEFING PREPARED FOR TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION AND AMERICA'S FUTURE
20 (2005), available at http:/ / pewhispanic.org/ files/ reports/46. pdf.
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The current approach in immigration law and procedure operates
under the tacit assumption that children have the same status and interests
as their parents. Consider Scenario 1:
Fatima is from Mali. She and her nine-year-old daughter Uma
entered the United States less than one year ago on visitor visas
after Fatima's husband died. Fatima applied for asylum based on
her own past persecution as the victim of female genital mutilation.
Fatima's asylum application also included Fatima's fear of future
persecution of female genital mutilation being performed on her
daughter. As a widow, Fatima cannot protect Uma from female
genital mutilation.
Under these facts, Fatima's and Uma's cases will most likely be
combined into a single proceeding.47 In the United States, removal
proceedings can take place without a child's knowledge, let alone the
child's participation.48 It is also possible that an asylum claim for Uma will
not even be filed, and that her story will simply be told through her
mother's claim. 49 When cases are consolidated, a decision is usually made
only on the lead applicant's case.50 If Fatima, the lead applicant, is granted
asylum, then Uma will be granted asylum as a derivative and both of them
will be able to remain safely in the United States.51
As Scenario 1 illustrates, the current approach in immigration law and
procedure sometimes results in effective protection in cases where
accompanied children have the same status and interests as their parents.
However, even in these situations, accompanied children may be ignored,
and thereby denied effective protection.
Changing the facts only slightly from Scenario 1 shows how, even
when there is an alignment of status and interests, the current approach
can result in a failure of effective protection for accompanied children.
Consider Scenario 2:
47. See David Thronson, Choiceless Choices: Deportation and the Parent-Child Relationship, 6
NEV. L.J. 1165, 1181-82 (2006).
48. The immigration judge may waive the presence of a minor child when at least one of
the child's parents or legal guardians is present. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25 (2008).
49. ld; see also Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447, 451 (7th Cir. 1995) ("In order to economize on
its limited resources, the INS usually does not bother to institute a formal deportation
proceeding against an alien who is likely to depart anyway, such as the minor child of parents
who are being deported.").
50. Since children who are accompanying or will be joining a parent can be granted
asylum if the parent is granted asylum, decisions are usually only given on the parent's case
and the child receives the same status. See INA § 208(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (2006).
51. Id. However, under United States asylum law, children cannot claim their parents as
derivatives. See Thronson, supra note 47, at 1181 n.83 ("Children who are U.S. citizens
ultimately may petition for their parents but only when they reach age 21, the age at which
immigration law ceases to consider them children.") (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2000)).
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Fatima is from Mali. She and her nine-year-old daughter Uma
entered the country less than one year ago on visitor visas after
Fatima's husband died. Fatima applied for asylum based on her
involvement in an opposition political party in Mali. She fears for
her own safety and the safety of her family if she is forced to return
to Mali. Fatima was a victim of female genital mutilation when she
was a child and hopes it will not happen to her daughter Uma.
Fatima does not think to tell the decision-maker about this fear
because she is most worried about her actions in the opposition
party.52
Under these facts, the likely consolidation of Uma's case with Fatima's
could result in a failure to consider Uma's case individually and,
consequently, a failure to provide her with effective protection.
Undocumented children like Uma, who have no legal right to stay in the
United States, constitute sixteen percent of the United States
undocumented population.5 3 Undocumented children have the right to
apply for asylum individually,54 but children whose parents are in removal
proceedings are often, as Scenario 2 illustrates, rendered invisible.5 5 In
52. The U.S. immigration system has multiple points of entry and multiple layers of
decision-making. Individuals may enter the immigration system by choice (e.g., submitting an
application for relief) or because the government requires it (e.g., receiving a notice to appear
in immigration court). Depending on the entry point and the relief requested the initial
decision-maker on the individual's case may be an officer or an immigration judge. For
purposes of this Article I have used the word "decision-maker" as a general term for
individuals within the immigration system who make decisions about applications for relief.
53. Passel, supra note 13.
54. There is no lower age limit on the right to claim asylum. Jacqueline Bhabha, Children
as Refugees and Displaced Persons: "More Than Their Share of Sorrows": International Migration
Law and The Rights of Children, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 253, 266 (2003) (citing Convention
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 3 (1),
Dec. 10, 1984, 1988 U.S.T. LEXIS 202, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114; Cartagena Declaration on
Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico
and Panama, Inter-Am. art. III, para. 3, Nov. 22, 1984 C.H.R., OAS/Serv.L/V/II.66, doc. 10,
rev. 1, (1984); OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
art 1., paras. 1-2, Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 47; Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, arts. 32-33, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6276, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, 174-76; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl., G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., art. 14, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948)).
55. See Bhabha, supra note 54, at 254:
Whereas considerable attention had been paid to the social welfare and
tracing needs of child refugees living in camps or found internally
displaced and separated from their families, the legal and procedural
obstacles facing child asylum seekers were generally unacknowledged. It
was assumed that children could be dealt with under the procedures
directed at families - that where the head of household or parent was
eligible for refugee protection, the child would be too; and that if
protection was refused, arrangements for the family would include the
children. This set of assumptions was based on two largely unquestioned
premises: first, that child asylum seekers traveled with their families and
could be subsumed with the family asylum application, and second, that
children could have no independent claim to asylum in their own right
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some cases, independent asylum claims of children may not even be
articulated, even if the child has the strongest claim for asylum. In the
United States, when a parent accompanies a child refugee applicant, the
child's claim is "typically subsumed under that of the parent and is not
considered separately."5 6 This invisibility can have dire consequences. If
Fatima wins her political asylum claim, then Uma will be allowed to stay
as a derivative.57 However, if Fatima loses, then Uma will be removed
along with her mother. Failing to provide an individualized determination
on Uma's case, or even a process for advancing Uma's claim independent
of Fatima's, will result in Uma being completely invisible and unprotected
in the immigration process.
Accompanied children with the same status and interests as their
parents are often invisible in the immigration system. They have access to
effective protection when the parent's claim is successful or when the
parent actively advocates on behalf of the child. These children are at risk,
however, when a parent's claim fails or when a parent neglects to notify
the immigration decision-maker of the plight of the accompanied child.
The risk of invisibility highlighted in Scenarios I and 2 is exacerbated when
an accompanied child's interests conflict with those of his or her parent.
over and above the family's claim.
(explaining that historically the difficulties and needs of unaccompanied children were
hidden from public view and arguing that "scholars, policy makers, and advocates consider
the position of child migrants independently [of their families]"). See generally Progress
Report on Refugee Children and Adolescents, including UNHCR's Strategy for Follow-Up to
the Report on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Children, EC/47/SC/CRP.19 (Oct. 1, 2001),
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3dOdaO355.html (explaining that refugee
children are often "invisible" in policymaking because refugees are often thought of as a
uniform group and that there is a tendency to think of refugee children simply as dependants
of adults).
56. WOMEN'S COMMISSION FOR REFUGEE WOMEN & CHILDREN, PRISON GUARD OR PARENT?:
INS TREATMENT OF UNACCOMPANIED REFUGEE CHILDREN 5 (2002), available at
http://www.womenscommission.org/pdf/ins-det.pdf; see also Salameda v. INS, 70 F.3d 447,
451 (7th Cir. 1995) ("In order to economize on its limited resources, the INS usually does not
bother to institute a formal deportation proceeding against an alien who is likely to depart
anyway, such as the minor child of parents who are being deported."); Alexandrova v. INS,
No. 97-3932, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 20612 (6th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (unpublished table
decision) (noting that, despite independent claims by his wife and child, the father "was the
sole witness to testify. His testimony related solely to his own eligibility for asylum.").
57. See INA § 208(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (2006) (allowing children who
accompany parents to be granted the same asylum status as the parents). Highlighting this
problem is not an argument in favor of eliminating derivative asylum claims. Many cases
could be such that a parent has the strongest claim and the child has no claim to asylum, and
therefore a consolidation of cases results in the child staying in the United States as a
derivative simply because of the parent receiving protection. However it should not be the
case, as the system currently operates, that, even if the child has the strongest claim in a family
unit, the child often loses access to protection by virtue of being in a family.
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B. Accompanied Child in Same Status Family with Conflicting
Interests
An accompanied child with the same status as his or her parent but
who does not share the same interests is often completely invisible in the
current immigration system. When the interests of the parent and child
conflict and the parent condones or misapprehends the persecution facing
the child, there is almost no chance that the child's fate will be considered
by the decision-maker. In fact, United States immigration law fails to
protect children whose parents may be participating in, or condoning, the
persecution experienced by the child.58
Slight alterations to Scenarios 1 and 2 above illustrate this risk of
invisibility. Consider Scenario 3:
Fatima is from Mali. She and her nine-year-old daughter Uma
entered the country less than one year ago on visitor visas after
Fatima's husband died. Fatima applied for asylum based on her
involvement in an opposition political party in Mali. She fears for
her own safety and the safety of her family if she is forced to return
to Mali. Fatima had female genital mutilation performed on her
when she was ten years old. Fatima does not oppose this practice
and, if returned to Mali, Uma will have it performed on her when
she turns ten.
As described above, in the United States immigration system, it is
highly unlikely that Uma will have an individualized hearing or even a
determination on her claim. 59 If her mother is not removed, Uma will
indirectly be protected from female genital mutilation.60 If, however,
Uma's mother is removed, Uma will also be removed and persecuted
without ever having had her claim evaluated or even heard.
C. Accompanied Child in Mixed-Status Family with Aligned
Interests
Children who have a legal right to stay in the United States and whose
58. Courts have recognized that a parent may be a persecutor. See, e.g., Bah v. Gonzales,
462 F.3d 637, 647 (6th Cir. 2006) (Lawson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("Family members, including parents, may persecute each other, and therefore they may be
the source 'of a well-founded fear of persecution on account of... membership in a particular
social group."') (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(A)).
59. See supra Part ll.A.
60. This scenario assumes that the United States laws against female genital mutilation, 18
U.S.C. § 116 (2006), and the child abuse protection mechanisms available to all children in the
United States either prevent Fatima from attempting female genital mutilation on her
daughter if they stay in the United States, or protect Uma if such an attempt is made.
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parents are put in removal proceedings also face the danger of being
rendered invisible. However, their invisibility is due to the fact that in
most cases there is no avenue for immigration decision-makers to take their
interests into account. Sadly, decision-makers have recently been making
the blanket assumption that these children can stay in the United States,
and the reality of their family lives is ignored.
Accompanied children in mixed status families frequently have
permission to remain in the United States because they received citizenship
as a result of their birth in the United States. 61 However, there is often a
significant gap between what is legally permissible and the reality of these
children's lives. Accompanied children may have legal permission to
remain in the United States, but will be directly affected by the decision of
the immigration system because their parents will relocate them when
removed from the United States.
The Olowo case described in the Introduction presents such a scenario:
the accompanied children had a parent who shared their interests but not
their status. Esther Olowo advocated for the interests of her legal
permanent resident children. She told the immigration court that her
daughters would be persecuted as a direct result of her removal.62 For
many accompanied children in this situation, immigration decision-makers
would simply ignore the plight of the children, 63 since the immigration
proceeding only rules on the removal of the parent.64 However, the
Seventh Circuit realized that ignoring the reality of the direct effect of
Olowo's removal on her legal permanent resident children would put the
children at risk of persecution. In response to this reality, the court turned
to what it deemed to be the only available alternative: referring the case to
the child protection services of Illinois in order to protect the children.65
From a protection perspective, this outcome allows the children to be
protected from the harm of female genital mutilation; from a child welfare
or family unity perspective, however, this approach is problematic. The
immigration system essentially made a custody decision by deporting the
61. In 2005 there were 6.6 million families in which the head of the family or the spouse
was unauthorized, and 3.1 million children in these families are United States citizens. Passel,
supra note 13, at ii.
62. See Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 692 (7th Cir. 2004).
63. In certain cancellation of removal cases, decision-makers are explicitly required to
evaluate the impact of removal on the United States citizen or legal permanent resident child.
In order to obtain relief, an applicant must prove that his or her removal would "result in
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to" the individual's United States citizen or
permanent resident child, spouse, or parent. INA §240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2006).
64. In fact, courts have consistently rejected "constructive deportation" arguments on
behalf of children. See, e.g., Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1048 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[Tihe
concept of 'constructive deportation' should not apply here because the Petitioners' daughter,
a United States citizen, has a legal right to remain in this country"); Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d
634, 645 (6th Cir. 2004) ("To the extent recent cases suggest that [constructive deportation] has
continuing currency, they do so in the context of concrete indications the child would be forced
to accompany the deported parent.") (emphasis added).
65. Olowo, 368 F.3d at 703.
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mother. While the state child protection system utilizes a "best interests of
the child" approach, the option that may be best - the children remaining
with their mother - will no longer be available because of the immigration
decision. The disconnect between these two systems, combined with the
lack of a uniform "best interests of the child" approach in the immigration
system, means children like Esther's will either be harmed or abandoned.
For accompanied children in mixed status families who have the same
interests as their parents, there is one exception to the invisibility faced by
children like Esther's. The accompanied child's interests may be
recognized when the parent of the accompanied child qualifies for one
form of cancellation of removal. 66 The requirements for this type of
cancellation of removal include proving that the individual's removal
would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to their United
States citizen or legal permanent resident child, spouse, or parent.67
Under this form of relief from removal, certain United States citizen
and legal permanent resident children are not as invisible as they are in
other forms of relief, since the hardship that such children would suffer
upon the deportation of the parent is a factor in determining the parent's
eligibility for relief. However, even if one assumes that the "exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship" standard is a proxy for a best interests
analysis, 68 this approach fails to protect children in families where the
parent has not been in the United States for the requisite physical presence
requirement.
Accompanied children in mixed-status families who have the same
interests as their parents have an even higher risk of invisibility and failure
of protection than the accompanied children described in the scenarios
above. Absent cases in which the parent qualifies for cancellation of
removal, accompanied children in mixed status families whose interests
align with those of their parents typically have no access to the
immigration process or other protection. These risks are the highest,
however, for children in mixed status families with conflicting interests.
D. Accompanied Child in Mixed Status Family with Conflicting
Interests
Accompanied children in mixed status families whose interests do not
66. To qualify for cancellation of removal undocumented individuals must have resided
continuously for at least ten years in the United States, be of good moral character, not have
been convicted of any crimes that would make them deportable or inadmissible, and show
that their removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to their United
States citizen or legal permanent resident child, spouse, or parent. 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b); 8 C.F.R.
§§ 1240.11(a), 1240.20 (2008).
67. Id.
68. See infra Part 111.B. (comparing the "best interests" approach with the "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship" standard).
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align with those of their parents may be the most vulnerable in the United
States immigration system. The invisibility problem of accompanied
children in same status families 69 seems like a minor issue compared to the
complete lack of access to any type of protection mechanism faced by
accompanied children in mixed status families with conflicting interests.
To see this result, simply change the facts of the Olowo case. Imagine that
Esther Olowo had not opposed female genital mutilation. In such a
situation she would not have voiced the plight of her daughters to the
immigration court, and the Seventh Circuit would not have referred the
case to child protective services. As a result, Esther would have been
ordered removed, taken her daughters with her, and allowed them to be
subjected to female genital mutilation. When there is a conflict of interest,
there is simply no venue where the persecution facing Esther's daughters
can be exposed. 70
Regardless of the child's status or interests, every accompanied child
directly affected by immigration proceedings is at risk of being unable to
access protection. Whether this invisibility and protection failure stems
from a parent's benign omission to raise the child's claim, from the parent's
participation in the persecution of the child, or from the child's legal status,
it can be solved by incorporating a "best interests of the child" approach
into the domestic immigration system.
Il1. THE CONSIDERATION OF THE INTERESTS OF CHILDREN IN DOMESTIC
IMMIGRATION LAW
The plight of children directly affected by immigration decisions has
not been completely ignored by United States law and policy. 71 In fact, the
United States has already considered, and sometimes incorporated, a "best
interests of the child" analysis for certain children directly affected by
immigration proceedings. Use of the "best interests of the child" approach
in domestic immigration law ranges from being mandated by statute to
complete absence, depending on the type of relief available to the child.
69. See supra Part II.A-B.
70. For an accompanied child in a mixed status family with an alignment of interests,
cancellation of removal provides a venue for the plight of the child to be put forward. When a
parent's interest conflicts with the child, cancellation of removal does not provide such a
venue. A parent applying for cancellation of removal defines and articulates the exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship the child will face. If the parent does not identify or put
forward a hardship, it will not be part of the claim.
71. In 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued
guidelines for children's asylum claims. INS GUIDELINES FOR
CHILDREN's ASYLUM CLAIMS, FILE 120/11.26 (1998) available at
http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/ins-guidelines for children.pdf.
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A. Best Interests Applied: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status
Unaccompanied or separated children may apply for a unique form of
relief, special immigrant juvenile status (SIJS). 72 To be eligible for SIJS
relief, an applicant must be declared a dependent of a juvenile court in the
United States, be deemed eligible and continue to be eligible for long-term
foster care, and have been the subject of judicial or administrative
proceedings in which it was determined that it was not in the best interests
of the minor child to be returned to his or her country of nationality or
country of last habitual residence.73 The analysis for this form of relief
includes a "best interests of the child" determination by a non-immigration
judge adjudicator with special expertise in issues facing children.74
B. A Nod to Best Interests: Cancellation of Removal
For accompanied children, cancellation of removal is the only form of
relief explicitly requiring any examination of their plight.75  An
immigration judge adjudicating an application for cancellation of removal
for a parent of a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident child is
required by law to evaluate certain hardships facing the child; however,
many decisions on cancellation of removal include almost no analysis
regarding this element of relief.7 6 To qualify for cancellation of removal,
individuals must meet certain physical presence, admissibility, and
hardship requirements. 77 The hardship requirement is whether the legal
permanent resident or United States citizen child will face "exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship" 78 if the parent is removed. This is a very high
bar. 79 In addition, the analysis often fails to consider the true impact on the
72. INA § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (West, Westlaw through Dec. 2008
amendments).
73. Id.
74. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(d)(2)(iii) (2008).
75. For the requirements of cancellation of removal, see supra note 66.
76. Hardships facing the child are usually put forward by the parent who is named in the
removal proceeding. As discussed above, in Section lI.B., when there are conflicting interests
this can be problematic for the child.
77. See supra note 66.
78. INA § 240A(b)(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2006); see Linda Kenepaske, Basics of
Removal Proceedings in Immigration Law, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, BASIC IMMIGRATION
LAW 289 (2008) ("Criteria for establishing extreme hardship include: age of the subject;
conditions of health; political and economic conditions in the country to which the alien will
be returning; emotional effect of separation from family .. "); see also In re Ige, 20 1. & N. Dec.
880, 881-82 (B.I.A. 1994); Mark R. von Sternberg, Cancellation of Removal Under the Immigration
and Nationality Act: Emerging Restrictions on the Availability of "Humanitarian" Remedies, in
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, BASIC IMMIGRATION LAW 365-368 (2008); S. Adam Ferguson, Not
Without My Daughter: Deportation and the Termination of Parental Rights, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 85,
101 (2007) (citing Nora V. Demleitner, How Much Do Western Democracies Value Family and
Marriage?: Immigration Law's Conflicted Answers, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 298 (2003)).
79. Ferguson, supra note 78, at 101 (noting that the exceptional and extremely unusual
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child. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), 80 in In re Monreal-
Aguinaga, found that forcing Daisy and Eric, both United States citizens, to
leave with their father did not meet the bar.81 The BIA made this finding
despite the fact that Eric, who was around nine at the time, testified that he
would like to stay in the United States.82 However, the court conducted
"no other assessment of the impact on the children of separation from their
childhood home and customary family circle."8 3
The analysis required for cancellation of removal is preferable to the
total invisibility facing many children in immigration proceedings, since it
at least examines certain interests of the child during removal proceedings.
However, it does not go far enough: there is a difference between a "best
interests" analysis and an "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship"
analysis.8 4
Assuming arguendo that a "best interests" analysis is the equivalent of
the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" analysis, this form of
relief still fails to measure up to the "best interests" standard. Cancellation
of removal does not provide a venue for children to express their own
views about what is in their best interests, nor does it provide a mechanism
for the court to obtain independent evidence about the best interests of the
child.85  This approach does not evaluate permanency for the child.
Cancellation of removal also excludes many children directly affected by
their parents' immigration proceedings, as it does not protect
undocumented accompanied children. Moreover, because of its physical
residency requirement, cancellation of removal does not consider the
interests of United States citizen and legal permanent resident children of
hardship requirement is "very difficult to satisfy"); see, e.g., INS v. Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145
(1981) (holding that a "narrow interpretation is consistent with the 'extreme hardship'
language, which itself indicates the exceptional nature of the suspension remedy"); Marquez-
Medina v. INS, 765 F.2d 673, 677 (7th Cir. 1985) ("IThe loss of a job along with its employee
benefits does not entail extreme or unique economic hardship."); Diaz-Salazar v. INS, 700 F.2d
1156, 1160 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that "economic conditions in an alien's homeland are not a
dispositive factor in a suspension hearing," and that the petitioner required "some factor
beyond the general misery attendant upon deportation" to "justify relief under the extreme
hardship standard"), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1132 (1983).
80. The Board of Immigration Appeals is the administrative appellate body charged with
interpreting immigration statutes and regulations and reviewing decisions by Immigration
Judges.
81. In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 1. & N. Dec. 56 (B.I.A. 2001).
82. Id. at 64.
83. Thronson, supra note 10, at 979 (citing In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 1. & N. Dec. 56).
84. But see Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1012 (2005) (finding that
cancellation of removal does include a best interests determination because the child's "'best
interests' are merely the converse of 'hardship.'")
85. Again, there is no venue for the child independent of what the parent puts forward.
As discussed above, there are numerous reasons why a parent may not provide such
evidence; individuals in removal proceedings often do not have lawyers and/or have to
prepare their case from detention. In contrast, in both child abuse and SIJS proceedings, an
advocate whose interests do not conflict with those of the child adduces evidence on behalf of
the child's best interests. See supra note 30.
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individuals who have been in the United States for less than ten years. As
Judge Posner noted in his concurrence in Oforji v. Ashcroft:
The seven-year (now ten-year) rule has only a tenuous relation to
the hardship of children whose parent is ordered deported. What
is true is that the longer the children have lived in the United
States, the greater the hardship to them of being sent back to their
parent's native country - one of the unappetizing choices facing
these children and a choice made more excruciating the longer
they remain here and become acclimated to American ways. But
the length of time a child has lived in the United States depends on
when she was born as well as on when her parent came to the
United States .... The seven-year (or ten-year) rule is irrational
viewed as a device for identifying those cases in which the
hardship to an alien's children should weigh against forcing her to
leave the country. 86
The recognition that hardship to a child should be a factor in granting
relief to a parent is an important step toward protecting accompanied
children. However, this approach, as applied in cancellation of removal
cases, fails to protect many children who are at risk of persecution.
C. Best Interests Implied: T and U Visas
Implicit in the "bests interests of the child" analysis in United States
child welfare law is an assumption that, until proven otherwise, it is in the
best interests of children to remain with their parents. 8 7  Domestic
immigration law seems to have adopted this premise in certain areas.
Individuals under the age of twenty-one who qualify for either a T or U
Visa 88 may petition for visas for their parents.89 However, this respect for
86. Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 620 (2003).
87. See Linda D. Elrod, Summary of the Year in Family Law, 27 FAM. L.Q. 485, 501 (1994)
(noting the presumption "that it is in the best interests of the child to be with natural parents
unless the parent abandoned the child, the parent's immoral conduct adversely affects the
child's interests, or the parent is unfit to have custody"); see also Naomi R. Cahn, Refraining
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 19 (1997) (stating in the context of adoption
that "[tihere is simply no issue as to whether it would be in the best interests of the child for
her to remain with her biological parents, or for her to be adopted, because of the strong
presumption that a child belongs with her biological parents.").
88. T and U visas are nonimmigrant visas available for foreign nationals who have been
victims of certain crimes. To qualify for a T visa an applicant must show that he or she
(I) is or has been a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons... ;
(II) is physically present in the United States . . . on account of such
trafficking ... ;
(lll)(aa) has complied with any reasonable request for assistance in the...
investigation or prosecution of acts of trafficking... ;
(bb) is unable to cooperate... due to physical or psychological trauma;
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the family unit, which allows the child to be the source of immigration
relief for his or her parents, is unique to T and U visas and is not standard
throughout immigration law.
D. Best Interests Through the Back Door: Asylum, Withholding of
Removal, and Protection Under the Convention Against
Torture
Though United States immigration law does not refer explicitly to the
"best interests of the child" standard outside of the SIJS context,
immigration decision-makers have historically been sensitive to the plight
of the directly affected children of immigrant parents who fear persecution
or torture. In the United States, individuals who fear persecution or torture
may apply for asylum,90 withholding of removal,9' or relief under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT).92 Decisions refusing to consider the
harm faced by a directly affected child when evaluating the lead
applicant's claim for protection from persecution or torture have only
arisen in the past few years:
Prior to 2003, we are not aware of a single instance wherein a court
questioned the premise that harm faced by an applicant's child is
relevant to the applicant's own asylum claim. In fact the
(cc) or has not attained 18 years of age; and
(IV) ...would suffer extreme hardship involving unusual and severe
harm upon removal ....
INA § 101(a)(15)(T), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(T) (West, Westlaw through Dec. 2008
amendments). Additionally, the applicant must meet certain eligibility requirements under
INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2006), and must not have committed a severe form of trafficking in
persons. See § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i); INA § 214(o)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(o)(1) (2006).
To qualify for a U visa, an applicant must show that he or she has suffered substantial
abuse due to being a victim of certain criminal activity; the applicant (or the parent, guardian
or next friend if the applicant is under sixteen) possesses information concerning that criminal
activity and assists or will assist in the investigation or prosecution; and the criminal activity
violated the laws of the United States or occurred in the United States. 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(15)(U); see also INA § 214(p), 8 U.S.C.A. § 118 4 (p) (West, Westlaw through Dec. 2008
amendments).
89. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(ii), (T)(ii)(l).
90. To qualify for asylum, an applicant must demonstrate that he or she is unwilling or
unable to return to his or her country because of past persecution or a "well-founded fear of
future persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining "refugee"); see INA § 208, 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006) (stating that a grant of asylum is based on a finding that the
applicant is a refugee under § 1101(a)(42)(A)).
91. To qualify for withholding of removal, an applicant must demonstrate that his or her
life or freedom would be threatened because of the applicant's race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(A) (2006).
92. To be eligible for relief under the Convention Against Torture an applicant must
establish "that it is more likely than not he or she would be subjected to torture if removed." 8
C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c)(2), 1208.16(c)(2) (2008).
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government itself furnished relief to several parents on the basis of
evidence that their removal would put citizen children at risk of
FGC [female genital cutting]. For example, the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued a stay of
deportation in 1994 to Nigerian national, Ms. Virginia Anikwata,
when she applied for CAT protection, asserting that her citizen
daughter's subjection to FGC would constitute torture as to Ms.
Anikwata herself. . . . Likewise an IJ in Oregon granted
withholding of removal to a woman whose U.S. citizen daughters
would face the "extreme hardship" of FGC if she were deported.93
In addition, prior to 2003, federal courts seem to have agreed that
grave harm to an applicant's child could form the basis of an applicant's
persecution or torture claim. 94 Since 2003, however, the theory that
persecution to a child could constitute persecution to a parent has been
diminished or overturned in a number of federal circuits. 95 Only the Sixth
Circuit has affirmed this theory and granted protection to a parent on the
basis of the child's claim. 96
In 2003, the Seventh Circuit, in Oforji v. Ashcroft, forcefully denied a
parent's claim for relief based on fear of persecution of the child. 97 Though
just one year earlier, in Nwaokolo v. Ashcroft, the Seventh Circuit had
granted a stay of removal based on the parent's fear for her daughter,98 the
Oforji Court held that
an alien parent who has no legal standing to remain in the United
States may not establish a derivative claim for asylum by pointing
to potential hardship to the alien's United States citizen child in the
event of the alien's deportation.99
The facts of Oforji, like Nwaokolo, involved a parent seeking protection
93. Marcelle Rice, Protecting Parents: Why Mothers and Fathers Who Oppose Female Genital
Cutting Qualify for Asylum, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS, Nov. 2004, at 1, 2 (internal citations
omitted).
94. ld; see also Nwaokolo v. INS, 314 F.3d 303, 304 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that applicant
has a better than negligible chance of proving that "she and her daughter, an United States
citizen, will suffer irreparable injury if she is removed from the United States at this time").
95. The Seventh Circuit is the most hostile to parent-child claims, while the Sixth Circuit
has affirmed these types of claims. The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
have used approaches in between the approaches of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. See infra
notes 103, 106, 107, 109, and 113 and accompanying text.
96. See infra discussion of Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004).
97. See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2003).
98. In Nwaokolo, the Seventh Circuit granted a stay of removal for a woman who had a
four-year-old United States citizen child, recognizing that the four-year-old would have "no
choice" but to return to Nigeria with her mother. 314 F.3d at 309 (7th Cir. 2002). Ms.
Nwaokolo feared her daughter would have female genital mutilation performed on her if she
went to Nigeria. Id. at 304.
99. Oforji, 354 F.3d at 618.
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based on the risk of female genital mutilation to the child. Despite these
similar facts, the Seventh Circuit stated in Oforji that "the law is clear that
citizen family members of illegal aliens have no cognizable interest in
preventing an alien's exclusion and deportation."'100
The Seventh Circuit reiterated its support for this position in its
decision in the Olowo case.101 In Olowo, "the Seventh Circuit cited Oforji for
the principle that a court may not weigh potential hardship to a family
member with LPR [legal permanent resident] status or citizenship in the
adjudication of an asylum claim." 10 2
The Fourth Circuit has also narrowed the availability of relief for a
parent fearing persecution of his or her child. In Niang v. Gonzales,103 the
court denied withholding of removal to a mother who feared her United
States citizen daughter would be subject to female genital mutilation if she
were returned to Senegal. The Fourth Circuit cited to the reasoning of
Oforji that hardship to a child cannot be used for a parent's claim.1°4 The
Fourth Circuit went beyond this reasoning and "announced a new, per se
rule that psychological harm without 'accompanying physical harm' [to the
parent] cannot establish persecution." 1 0 5 In the Fourth Circuit under Niang,
therefore, the possibility of physical persecution against the child is
irrelevant unless a parent will also experience physical harm.
The Eighth Circuit, relying on both Niang and Oforji, has adopted the
position that "an applicant may not establish a derivative claim for
withholding of removal based upon the applicant's child's fear of
persecution." 106 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have issued unpublished
denials of parent-child claims in the female genital mutilation context,
though neither circuit has issued precedential decisions regarding these
types of claims. The Fifth Circuit decision Osigwe v. Ashcroft'0 7 provided
minimal analysis in upholding the denial of the parents' claim. The court
held that the parents, who applied for asylum based on fear of female
genital mutilation against their daughter, were "ineligible for asylum
under the general asylum provisions."108 The Eleventh Circuit, in Axmed v.
Gonzales, upheld the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen the case of a Somali
woman who claimed she feared her United States citizen daughter would
suffer female genital mutilation if she were removed.1°9 In Axmed, the
100. Id.
101 Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2004).
102. Rice, supra note 93, at 4 (citing Olowo at 701).
103. 492 F.3d 505, 507 (4th Cir. 2007).
104. Id. at 512-13.
105. Lisa Frydman & Kim Thuy Seelinger, Kasinga's Protection Undermined? Recent
Developments in Female Genital Cutting Jurisprudence, 13 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULLETIN 1073, 1093
(Sept. 1, 2008) (citing Niang, 492 F.3d at 512).
106. Gumaneh v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2008).
107. 77 Fed. Appx. 235, 235-236 (5th Cir. 2003).
108. Id.
109. Axmed v. Gonzales, 145 Fed. Appx. 669 (11th Cir. 2005).
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Eleventh Circuit relied in part on Oforji for the proposition that "an alien
parent who has no legal standing to remain in the United States, may not
establish a derivative claim for asylum by pointing to the potential
hardship of their American-born children."1 10
While certain circuits do not even evaluate the effect of deporting the
parent of a United States citizen or legal permanent resident when
analyzing the claim of the parent,"' the Ninth and Sixth Circuits offer the
possibility of a different approach to these types of cases. The Ninth
Circuit has not issued a decision on the merits of a parent-child case, but it
has signaled its support for granting relief in these cases. In Abebe v.
Gonzales, the Ninth Circuit remanded a case to the BIA to consider the
parents' eligibility for asylum based on their fear that their daughter would
be subject to female genital mutilation in Ethiopia. u 2 This remand signals
the potential for success in protecting children by raising their plight in
their parents' case. Protecting children when a parent is in removal
proceedings has been given explicit support in the Sixth Circuit.
The Sixth Circuit's approach to parent-child cases, at least when
accompanied children have the same status as their parents, is in direct
opposition to the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits. In Abay v. Ashcroft,
the Sixth Circuit found a woman from Ethiopia eligible for asylum based
on her fear of being persecuted by being unable to protect her daughter
from female genital mutilation.11 3 Although this approach does protect
certain children, it is imperfect and does not provide the same access and
protection ensured by a "best interests of the child" approach.
As described in Scenario 3 above, if Abay had not opposed female
genital mutilation, or if she had supported it, she would not have claimed
that her daughter's female genital mutilation would amount to her own
persecution.114  Absent Abay's fear of her daughter's female genital
110. Axrned, 145 Fed. Appx. at 675. The Eleventh Circuit also cited to Azanor v. Ashcroft,
364 F.3d 1013, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2004) for this same proposition, but this was a mis-cite: "In
Azanor, the Ninth Circuit did not reach the merits of the parent-child issue and instead
remanded the mother's CAT [Convention Against Torture] claim to the BIA to consider the
proper legal standard." Frydman & Seelinger, supra note 105, at 1095.
111. See supra discussion of Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, p.199-
200. Despite its position on parent-child claims, the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that
United States citizen children are treated "as badly as aliens" in situations in which the
asylum claim of the non-citizen parent is denied:
[t]here is nothing in the record about the father of the younger girl.
Probably, then, the only condition in which the girls could remain in the
United States after their mother returned to Nigeria would be as foster
children. That is the same unlovely status they would occupy were they
aliens granted asylum while their mother was deported. So although
they are citizens they are treated as badly as aliens.
Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 620 618 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J., concurring) (noting that, for
an asylum applicant from Nigeria with two United States citizen daughters, the Seventh
Circuit had affirmed the decision to deport the mother).
112. Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037,1043 (9th Cir. 2005).
113. Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 642-643 (6th Cir. 2004).
114. See supra Part ll.B (highlighting the risks in the United States immigration system for
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mutilation, Abay and her daughter would have been deported to Ethiopia
and her daughter would have become a victim of female genital mutilation.
After the Oforji and Abay decisions, the BIA adopted the Seventh
Circuit's approach for parent-child cases.1 5 In a decision on a parent-child
case in the Fifth Circuit, the BIA, lacking precedent from the Fifth Circuit
itself, adopted the approach used by the Seventh Circuit in Oforji.116 In In
re A - K-, the BIA faced facts similar to those in Abay, but came to the
opposite conclusion.11 7 A - K - was a citizen of Senegal seeking to protect
his two United States citizen daughters from female genital mutilation.11 8
The immigration judge granted withholding of removal on two grounds.
First, the immigration judge found that A - K -'s daughters would "more
likely than not be forced to undergo female genital mutilation in the future
in Senegal."11 9 Second, the immigration judge made an alternative grant of
withholding of removal to A - K - on "'humanitarian grounds' based on
the severity of the potential harm to his children." 120
The government appealed the immigration judge's decision to the BIA,
which vacated the grant of withholding of removal on both grounds. 121 As
to the first ground, the BIA found the facts of the A - K- case to be "nearly
identical" to the facts of Oforji122 and distinguished the Abay decision based
on the difference in status between Abay's daughter and A - K -'s
daughters.123  Even though the BIA relied on the Seventh Circuit's
accompanied children who have the same status as their parents but conflicting interests).
115. BIA decisions are binding on Immigration Judges and all officers and employees of
the Department of Homeland Security. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2008). Historically the BIA has
followed a federal circuit court's precedent in cases arising within the jurisdiction of that
circuit. In re Anselmo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 25, 31-32 (B.I.A. 1989).
116 See In re A -K-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 275 (B.I.A. 2007).
117. See id. at 275-276.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 279.
121. The discussion infra focuses on the BIA's decision on the first ground. The BIA
vacated the humanitarian ground based on their interpretation that there is no discretionary
component in a humanitarian grant of withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006), and that this form of relief may not be granted if a "probability
of qualifying persecution to the applicant is not shown." In re A - K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 279.
122. In re A - K -, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 277; see Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 2003),
discussed supra, p. 199-200.
123. "[Abay] involved a decision where the daughter of the alien in removal proceedings
had no lawful status in the United States and could not legally remain in the country in the
event of her mother's removal in order to avoid persecution," whereas A-K-'s daughters
were United States citizens. In re A - K-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 277 (citing Abay v. Ashcroft, 368
F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2004)). This is a distinction without a difference, however, because a parent
may not obtain derivative asylum status through his or her child; though a child without
status may obtain asylum whereas a child who is a United States citizen may not, both
children will be equally unable to prevent their parents from being deported unless the parent
herself obtains relief. See supra note 51. The status of the child should not be the focus of the
inquiry, therefore, but rather what will actually happen to the child upon the parent's
deportation. If the child will also leave if the parent is deported, the parent should receive
asylum based on whether the child will be persecuted and, if so, whether the persecution of
the child amounts to persecution of the parent.
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approach, the BIA neither mentioned the plight of the children nor made a
referral to child protective services as was done in Olowo, despite the
factual similarities between the two cases. 124
The failure of the BIA to mention the analysis and approach in Olowo
highlights the unusual nature of the Olowo decision. Like Olowo, A - K -
requested relief based on fear that his children, who had lawful status,
would be persecuted upon his deportation. Dismissing as "speculative" an
inquiry as to what would actually happen to the minor children if their
father were removed, the BIA instead focused on the fact that the children
were not legally required to accompany their father to Senegal. 125
[T]he statement of the Immigration Judge [that "members of
respondent's family and respondent's wife's family, as well as
other members of the Fulani tribe, would take whatever steps were
necessary to insure that respondent's two young U.S. citizen
daughters were subjected to the FGM procedure if returned to
Senegal,"] is highly speculative and assumes that the respondent's two
United States citizen children would return with the respondent to
Senegal, which is factually questionable if the respondent truly
believes that they would definitely be tortured there.126
The BIA did not provide any evidence to support its skepticism toward
A -K-'s testimony and the immigration judge's assumption that the
children would go to Senegal with their father. 127 It seems the BIA based
its decision regarding the plight of the United States citizen daughters on
its belief that, if A - K - were telling the truth about what would happen to
his children in Senegal, he simply would not take them there. 28 Perhaps
this maneuvering allowed the BIA to ignore its role in effectively deporting
the United States citizen daughters to a country where they would be
persecuted; sadly, this formalistic approach to protection results in no
protection at all in cases like A - K- .129
For directly affected children in immigration proceedings, access to
protection when the parent's and child's interests align will depend on
geography. If the child and parent reside in the Sixth or Ninth Circuits
they may be able to access protection. If the child and parent reside in any
124. In re A - K -, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 277.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 280 (emphasis added).
127. Moreover, there was no adverse credibility finding against A-K-. Id.
128. This skepticism toward the claim that the daughters would return with their father
conflicts with the BIA's approach in In re Ige, where the BIA actually required evidence that
the children would remain in the United States after their parents were deported. See In re Ige,
20 1. & N. Dec. 880, 885 (B.I.A. #1994). No such evidence was required in In re A - K-.
129. Arguably, the Seventh Circuit felt this route was not a possibility, which is why, in
Olowo, they made the unusual move of referring the case to child protective services. Olowo
v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 703-704 (7th Cir. 2004).
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of the other circuits, the BIA's decision in In re A - K - is controlling, and
protection will be denied. For children and parents in the Seventh Circuit,
not only will they be unable to access protection, they must also fear that,
in light of Olowo, children will be taken into custody of the state based on
testimony in immigration proceedings.
IV. BEST INTERESTS APPROACH IN IMMIGRATION LAW: THE CANADIAN MODEL
Unlike the United States, Canada has incorporated a "best interests of
the child" approach into its immigration law and proceedings.' 30 The
United States and Canada share analogous immigration histories and
immigration flows, and have developed immigration systems that have
many similarities. 131 In fact, Canada admits a greater proportionate share
of immigrants to North America than the United States.132  Most
importantly for the purpose of this Article, Canada and the United States
have mutually agreed that they both provide effective protection 133 for
individuals seeking protection under the Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees,1M in that an individual must make a claim for asylum in the
130. Canadian immigration law provides for the appointment of a best interests designee
for directly affected children and allows the child's best interests to be a component for
immigration relief for the child's parent. See infra notes 137 and 147. A survey of immigration
law and procedure in foreign countries is beyond the scope of this Article. However, Canada
is not the only country to incorporate a "best interests of the child" approach into their
immigration system. Australia has found the "best interests of the child" standard to be
relevant to proceedings involving the deportation of a parent. See Minister for Immigration
and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273, 289 (Austl.).
131. Monica Boyd, U.N. International Symposium on International Migration and
Development, June 28-30, 2006, Gender Aspects of International Migration to Canada and the
United States at 1, U.N. Doc. UN/POP/MIG/SYMP/2006/08 ("Both [the United States and
Canada] share many similarities in their immigration histories."); see id. at 2-3 (explaining that
both the United States and Canada view migrants as permanent and admit most with the
right to live permanently and that both countries also have similar approaches for individuals
who will enter only on a temporary basis).
132. Id. at 1. This makes Canada's model a good evaluative tool to determine whether
incorporating a "best interests of the child" approach leads to opening the proverbial
floodgates to immigrants. Since Canada admits a greater proportionate share of immigrants
than the United States, it is plausible to assume that Canada shares similar concerns about
opening the floodgates to immigrants and therefore would resist implementing a policy that
would encourage this type of immigration.
133. See Safe Third Country Agreement, U.S. - Canada, pmbl., Dec. 5, 2002, available at
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/laws-policy/safe-third.asp (last visited Mar. 15,
2009) [hereinafter Safe Third Country Agreement]; see also Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act (IRPA) § 102(a) (2001) c. 27 (Can.) (requiring any country designated as a safe
third country by the Canadian government to comply with Article 33 of the Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture). See
generally Memorandum, David A. Martin & Yvonne Lamoureux, Treatment of Gender-Based
Asylum Claims in the United States: Memorandum Prepared for the Attorney General of
Canada (Mar. 31, 2003) (on file with author) (analyzing gender-based claims in the United
States after the implementation of the Safe Third Country Agreement in response to criticism
that gender-based claims were less likely to be successful in the United States in comparison
to Canada).
134. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
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first of the two countries he or she arrives in, with some limited
exceptions.1 35 All of the scenarios analyzed in Part 1I of this Article center
around a directly affected child's ability to access protection. Since these
two countries are supposed to provide effective protection from non-
refoulement,136 the protection provided by the Canadian "best interests of
the child" approach should be the minimum for the United States
immigration system. However, for children who are directly affected by
United States immigration law, there is a significant difference between the
protection available in the United States and Canada.
A. "Best Interests of the Child" Designee
Unlike in the United States, immigration law in Canada requires the
designation of a representative for both unaccompanied and accompanied
children who are the subject of proceedings. 37 The representative is
designated at the time of the immigration hearing by the presiding member
of the Refugee Division making the immigration decision.138  The
mandatory criteria for designating a representative for child refugee
claimants includes that the "person must not be in a conflict of interest
situation with the child claimant such that the person must not act at the
expense of the child's best interests." 139  The person chosen as the
designated representative must "be willing and able to fulfill the duties of a
representative and to act in the 'best interests of the child."' 140  For
accompanied children, the designated representative is usually a parent.' 41
19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o-c-ref.htm.
135. See Safe Third Country Agreement, supra note 133, at art. 4, para. 1. These include
exceptions for family members, unaccompanied minors, document holders and other public
interest exceptions. Id. at art. 4, para. 2.
136. See Safe Third Country Agreement, supra note 133, at pmbl.
137. See IRPA § 167(2) (2001) c. 27 (Can.) (requiring the designation of a representative for
all persons under the age of 18 years who are the subject of proceedings).
138. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CAN., CONVENTION REFUGEE
DETERMINATION DIVISION (CRDD) HANDBOOK 10-8 (1999), available at
http://www.irb.gc.ca/eng/brdcom/references/legjur/rpdspr/guide/documents/handbook
_e.pdf [hereinafter CRDD HANDBOOK].
139. IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD, CHILD REFUGEE CLAIMANTS PROCEDURAL AND
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES, GUIDELINES ISSUED BY THE CHAIRPERSON PURSUANT TO SECTION 65(3) OF
THE IMMIGRATION ACT (Sept. 30, 1996), available at http://www.cisr-
irb.gc.ca/eng/brdcom/references/ pol/guidir/ Pages/ChiEnf.aspx [hereinafter CANADIAN
GUIDELINE].
140. Id. at Part 11. The duties of the designated representative are the following:
to retain counsel; to instruct counsel or to assist the child in instructing
counsel; to make other decisions with respect to the proceedings or to
help the child to make those decisions; to inform the child about the
various stages and proceedings of the claim; to assist in obtaining
evidence in support of the claim; to provide evidence and be a witness in
the claim; [and] to act in the best interests of the child.
Id.
141. See id. This approach strikes the right balance vis-A-vis immigration law and family
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However, if a parent is in conflict with the child's interest or is unable to
act in the best interests of the child, the parent will not be appointed the
child's designated representative.1 42
The Canadian "best interests of the child" approach also attempts to
reduce the invisibility of accompanied children in refugee proceedings.
The Canadian Guideline requires that even when a child's claim is heard
jointly with that of his or her parents, a separate refugee determination be
made. 43 In addition, while a child's claim is usually heard jointly with that
of his or her parents, a child's claim may be heard separately if a joint
hearing is "likely to cause an injustice." 144
B. Best Interests in Humanitarian and Compassionate Relief
The Canadian consideration of the best interests of the child does not
end with the appointment of a representative for all children in
proceedings. Canadian law also allows for the consideration of the best
interests of the child when a parent is facing removal from Canada and the
child has the right to remain. 45 A parent in such a situation can apply for
permanent residency in Canada through a humanitarian and
compassionate (H&C) relief application. 46 When considering applications
for H&C relief, decision-makers must take into account "the best interests
of the child directly affected." 147 Judicial interpretation of these provisions
has provided guidance on how to apply the "best interests of the child"
inquiry in such situations.148 The Federal Court of Appeal held that:
law. It respects the sanctity of the family, unless the parent is in a conflict of interest situation
with the child.
142. Id. at Part I (explaining the role of the "Designated Representative").
143. Id. (explaining the three categories of children who make refugee claims).
144. Convention Refugee Determination Division Rules SOR/93-45, 10(3) (Can.).
145. The child could either have refugee status in Canada or be a Canadian citizen. This
situation is analogous to the mixed status scenarios described above. See supra Part II.C-D.
146. See CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA, APPLYING FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE
FROM WITHIN CANADA: HUMANITARIAN AND COMPASSIONATE CONSIDERATIONS (2006). For
parents who have already received permanent residency, Canadian law allows for the best
interests of the child to help a parent overcome a failure in meeting the requirement of
continuous physical presence. Id.
147. IRPA § 25(1) (Can.). In addition, § 67(1)(c) of the IRPA empowers the Immigration
Appeal Division to grant an appeal if, "taking into account the best interests of a child directly
affected by the decision, sufficient humanitarian and compassionate considerations warrant
special relief ......
148. See Baker v. Canada, [19991 2 S.C.R. 817, 75 (Can.):
[In making H&C decisions,] the decision-maker should consider
children's best interests as an important factor, give them substantial
weight, and be alert, alive and sensitive to them. That is not to say that
children's best interests must always outweigh other considerations, or
that there will not be other reasons for denying an H&C claim even when
children's interests are given this consideration. However, where the
interests of children are minimized .. . the decision will be unreasonable.
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The "best interests of the child" are determined by considering the
benefit to the child of the parent's non-removal from Canada as
well as the hardship the child would suffer from either her parent's
removal from Canada or her own voluntary departure should she
wish to accompany her parent abroad. Such benefits and hardship
are two sides of the same coin, the coin being the best interest of
the child.149
This approach does not mean, however, that simply having a child will
prevent an individual's deportation from Canada or that there is a prima
facie presumption that the children's best interests will prevail.150 Instead,
the discretion created by H&C relief is to allow decision-makers to have
flexibility to approve of "deserving cases not anticipated" by other
immigration legislation. 151
The Canadian model - appointing a best interests designee,
determining a child's refugee status separately from the parents, and
considering the "best interests of the child" - can, if implemented
correctly, address the issues raised by both the Olowo case and the
scenarios described above. 15 2  Regarding Scenarios 1 and 2, where a
directly affected child shares the same status and interest as the parent, the
Canadian model can ensure that the child's claim is not invisible.
Regarding Scenario 3, in which the parent and child share the same status
but have conflicting interests, the appointment of a best interests designee
whose interests do not conflict with those of the child will increase the
likelihood that the decision-maker will be made aware of the child's plight.
Finally, for situations like the one facing Esther Olowo, the Canadian
model would allow for a grant of H&C relief, rather than a referral to child
protection proceedings.
In contrast with the approach taken by the United States, the
Canadian "best interests of the child" model increases access to protection
for and visibility of directly affected children in immigration proceedings.
However, the Canadian model may still fall short in ensuring the safety,
permanency and well-being of all directly affected children. A review of
how the best interests designee is appointed is needed to guarantee the
designee is not in conflict with the child. Placing the burden of appointing
the designee on the decision-maker may create incentives to look past
potential conflicts in order to resolve cases more quickly. For cases in
which a parent is found to have a conflict of interest with the child, the
149. Hawthorne v. Canada, [2002] F.C.A. 475, 4 (Can.)
150. See Legault v. Canada, [2002] 4 F.C. 358, 13 (Can.) (holding that in H&C
applications, there is not a prima facie presumption that the best interests of the child will
prevail).
151. Id. at 372, ! 21.
152. See supra Introduction (discussing Olowo case) and Part II (presenting scenarios).
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child should be appointed a separate lawyer in addition to a best interests
designee. Without a lawyer, there is no advocate for the wishes of the
child, which may be in conflict with or different from what is determined
to be the child's best interest. A best interests designee should be
appointed for all children directly affected by immigration proceedings,
not simply for those who are subject to proceedings. Finally, in order to
increase the ability for children to access protection, the "best interests of
the child" should be the primary consideration for H&C-type relief, not
simply a consideration.
V. INCORPORATING A "BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD" APPROACH FOR
DIRECTLY AFFECTED ACCOMPANIED CHILDREN INTO DOMESTIC IMMIGRATION
LAW AND POLICY
In order to protect directly affected children in immigration
proceedings, United States immigration law and procedure should, at a
minimum, incorporate the Canadian "best interest of the child" approach.
Statutory reform of this nature would both extend the protections that
some directly affected children already receive 53 and be more consistent
with international law.154 In addition, a best interests approach for directly
affected children would bring United States immigration law more in line
with other domestic areas of law where children are affected, such as child
custody and abuse and neglect.15 5  Both substantive and procedural
reforms15 6 are required to provide effective protection to all directly
affected children in immigration proceedings.
A. Procedural Reform
Procedural changes, such as requiring the designation of a best
153. Such as children who qualify for SIJS relief or, perhaps, certain children in some
asylum and cancellation of removal cases.
154. See discussion of the CRC, supra Part I.B.
155. In fact, some scholars argue there is not a bright line between immigration and family
law. See Thronson, supra note 11, at 508:
By deciding whether a particular relationship between a child and a
parent is worthy of recognition and assigning this relevance in
immigration law, immigration law regulates basic family decisions such
as where and with whom children will live. It influences private family
decisions and behavior as parents and children conform their actions to
qualifications set forth in immigration law.
See also id. at 510 (discussing Castro v. United States, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9440 (S.D. Tex. Feb.
9, 2007), an immigration case in which "the operation of immigration effectively functioned to
determine the custody of the child for the next three years."); Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law
and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625 (2007); Kerry Abrams, Polygamy,
Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641 (2005).
156. Substantive changes are those which create new claims for relief. Procedural reforms
are those which focus on policy and process.
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interests representative and providing separate decisions for accompanied
children who do not have status to remain in the United States will solve
many of the invisibility and lack-of-access problems highlighted above.157
Invisibility would decrease with the introduction of a designated
individual in the proceedings whose role is to determine and advocate for
the child's best interests. Simply having a best interests representative as
part of the immigration proceedings would help to alert decision-makers
that the child's claim is important and must be voiced. In a system that
requires individual determinations, it will be much harder for a child's
claim to be overlooked, either benignly or purposefully.
1. Best Interests Representative
All children directly affected by immigration proceedings in the United
States must have a designated best-interests-of-the-child representative
("best interests representative). 158  This representative should be
appointed at the beginning of the immigration procedure'5 9 after a
determination that the best interests representative is not in conflict with
the child's interests. 160
Guidelines for who might qualify to be a best interests representative,
and who would designate the representatives, would need to be defined.
At a minimum, the United States could adopt the criteria used in Canada.
Under Canadian law the best interests representative is designated by the
division making the immigration decision and the designee must be over
eighteen years old, be able to appreciate the nature of the proceedings, be
willing and readily able to represent the child, and not have a conflict of
interest with the child.161
2. Individual Determinations
For directly affected accompanied children without the right to remain
in the United States, an easy way to increase access and visibility is to
157. See supra Part II.
158. Child advocates charged with advocating for the best interest of the child are already
allowed for certain unaccompanied children. "The Secretary of Health and Human Services is
authorized to appoint independent child advocates for child trafficking victims and other
vulnerable unaccompanied alien children." 8 U.S.C.A. § 1232(c)(6) (West, Westlaw through
Dec. 2008 amendments).
159. One critique of Canada's approach is that it does not require a representative to be
designated at the beginning of the process. See CANADIAN COUNCIL FOR REFUGEES, IMPACTS
ON CHILDREN OF THE IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PROTECTION ACT 21 (Nov. 2004).
160. Similarly to the Canadian approach, the initial appointment of a best interests
representative must not be final. The process must be flexible enough that if a conflict of
interest arises at any point in the proceedings a new best interests representative could be
appointed. See CRDD HANDBOOK, supra note 138, at 10-7, 10-8.
161. Id. at 10-7.
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require individual determinations of their claims for relief.162 In cases
where a parent is granted relief and the child receives derivative relief, this
approach may seem redundant or wasteful. However, the reality of most
immigration proceedings in the United States is such that when the
decision on the parent's case is issued, the time for submitting and
gathering evidence has usually passed. If the decision-maker is only
required to make a decision on the parent's case, then the decision-maker
will gather information and spend time only on that case. The potential
gap in protection would arise in a case in which the parent's claim for relief
is denied and no evidence regarding the child's claim has been submitted
because the decision-maker had not anticipated having to make a
determination on the child's independent claim for relief. If individual
determinations for all directly affected children without status are too
burdensome, the alternative could be to require the staying of any removal
order for an accompanied child's parent until a new proceeding could be
brought on the child's claim for relief.
Procedural reform of appointing a best interests representative and
requiring individual determinations on children's cases would begin to
reduce the risks faced by directly affected accompanied children in
immigration proceedings. However, procedural reform alone will not
protect children in situations like those of Esther Olowo's daughters. To
protect Esther's daughters requires substantive reform that makes the "best
interests of the child" an element of relief from removal.
B. Substantive Reform
Substantive reform is required in conjunction with the procedural
reforms outlined above in order to fully address the protection gaps
highlighted by the Olowo case and the previously discussed scenarios. A
best interests determination must be made for children whose parents are
ordered removed and decision-makers must have the discretion to grant
relief if the best interests determination requires it. This substantive reform
will allow children who are United States citizens or legal permanent
residents and who are in mixed status families the right to access the same
protection that children without status often have access to.
1. Best Interests Determinations
A best interests representative can advocate for a child's best interests,
but any system incorporating a "best interests of the child" approach must
also include a venue to make a legal determination of the child's best
162. Again, this mirrors the Canadian approach. See CANADIAN GUIDELINE, supra note
139, at 2.
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interest. A "best interests of the child" determination must be made by the
immigration decision-maker for directly affected children when their
parents are ordered removed.163
Respecting the best interest of the child requires, as the Federal Court
in Canada recognized, 164 consideration of both the benefit to the child if the
parent were not removed and the hardship the child would suffer if only
the parent were removed or if the child accompanied the parent. A "best
interests of the child" determination is not needed in cases in which a
parent is not ordered removed.
2. Increased Decision-Maker Discretion
Substantive statutory reform of United States immigration law is
required in order to give effect to "best interests of the child"
determinations. To effectively protect directly affected accompanied
children, immigration decision-makers must be given discretion to grant
relief when it is in the best interests of a directly affected child. 165 Many of
the substantive changes required to increase decision-maker discretion in
order to give effect to the best interests of the child already exist in other
areas of United States immigration law and therefore simply need to be
expanded in order to provide protection for all directly affected
accompanied children.
Immigration decision-makers in the United States do not have the
discretion of their Canadian counterparts to address situations like the one
facing Esther Olowo and her twin daughters. Immigration decision-
makers need more discretion than they currently have in order to be able to
give the best interests of directly affected children primary consideration.
A new form of relief similar to Canada's H&C relief should be made
available to allow decision-makers to protect directly affected accompanied
children. Decision-makers should be able to take into account the issues
facing directly affected children and must be able to cancel the removal of a
parent when the plight of the directly affected child requires it.166
163. A best interests of the child determination is not required for children whose parents
are not ordered removed because presumably those directly affected children will have access
to protection mechanisms that are available to all children in the United States. When a
parent of a directly affected child is ordered removed, immigration law effectively becomes
child custody law, and a best interests of the child determination must be made so that the
interests of the directly affected child can be taken into account.
164. See supra notes 148-150.
165. A bill that would allow this type of discretion in cases involving only United States
citizen children is currently pending in Congress. Under the standard outlined in this bill, the
parent of a United States citizen child could be granted relief from removal if the immigration
judge determines that such a removal would be "clearly against the best interests of the
child." H.R. 1176, 110th Congress (2007).
166. By allowing family members to remain unified when the best interests of the child
require it, this approach respects the constitutional limits on the state's intervention in the
child parent relationship. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal
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Immigration decision-makers should be required to give primary
consideration to the best interests of the child when deciding whether the
child's parent(s) will receive relief from removal.
While allowing directly affected children to be the basis for
immigration relief for a parent, as is done in H&C relief, may initially seem
to be a significant departure from current United States immigration law,16 7
it is, in fact, simply an extension of an approach already offered to certain
foreign national children.168 Foreign national children who have been
victims of human trafficking or other serious crimes in the United States
may qualify for T or U Visas, 169 forms of relief which allow them to petition
for visas on behalf of their parents. 170 Since the United States immigration
system already provides an avenue for certain vulnerable children1 7' to
obtain permission for their parents to remain in or come to the United
States, expanding this regime to all directly affected children would make
United States immigration law more consistent such that every child would
be equally protected. 172 It seems counterintuitive that a foreign national
who is a victim of a crime in the United States may receive protection and
has a right to reunite with his or her parents but a United States citizen
who is at risk of being the victim of a crime may not access protection nor
be allowed to remain in the United States with his or her parents.1 73
Increasing judicial discretion to allow parents to remain in the United
States when it is in the best interests of the child also respects the structure
and history of United States immigration law. Family reunification is the
"dominant feature of current arrangements for permanent immigration to
the United States."174 The legislative history of the Immigration and
with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply
nor hinder."); see also Troxel v. Granville 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) ("ITihe interest of parents in the
care, custody, and control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty
interests recognized by [the Supreme Court].").
167. United States citizens may petition for their parents, but not until they reach the age
of twenty-one. INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006). In addition, children
cannot provide derivative asylum for their parents. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3) (limiting
derivative asylum to the spouse or child of an asylee).
168. T and U visas allow a child to be the basis for a parent's immigration relief. See supra
note 88 (summarizing eligibility requirements for T and U visas). Giving deference to the
plight of a child in order to create an avenue for immigration relief is also in line with historic
approaches to this type of claim in the asylum law context.
169. See supra note 88 (summarizing eligibility requirements for T and U visas).
170. See INA § 101(a)(15)(T)(ii)(I), (U)(ii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(ii)(l), (U)(ii) (West,
Westlaw through Dec. 2008 amendments); see also supra Part lll.C (discussing the availability
of immigration relief for a parent when a child receives a T or U Visa).
171. Arguably, as victims of a crime or human trafficking, these children have already
demonstrated their vulnerability.
172. The need for such reform from a protection standpoint is illustrated in the scenarios
above. See supra Part 1I.
173. See supra Part III.C. (highlighting the availability of immigration relief for the parents
of foreign national children who receive T or U Visas).
174. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 319 (4th ed. 1998) (noting the special preferences in U.S. immigration law for
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Nationality Act "clearly indicates that the Congress intended to provide for
a liberal treatment of children and was concerned with the problem of
keeping families of United States citizens and immigrants united." 175
United States immigration law sets aside a large number of visas every
year to reunite families of adult citizens1 76 and includes a waiver of
inadmissibility for "humanitarian purposes, family unity, or when it is
otherwise in the public interest." 177
Implementing a form of relief similar to Canada's H&C relief would
bring immigration law more in line with the United States' historical
approach of respecting families. The Supreme Court has stated that "[o]ur
decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in the
Nation's history and tradition."178 In light of this history, protecting the
sanctity of family while at the same time protecting children from
persecution and torture should not be a controversial policy position.
However, the politics of immigration law and policy in the United States
mean such an approach will be met with criticism.
C. Critiques of Proposed Reforms
Critiques of the substantive and procedural reforms suggested above
will likely include the scarcity of resources to implement such a plan, the
placement of responsibility of the best interests of the child with an agency
responsible for interpreting federal immigration law, and the potential for
opening the floodgates to immigrants by allowing children to be a source
of immigration relief for parents.
immediate relatives of United States citizens).
175. H.R. REP. No. 85-1199, pt. 2 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2016, 2020.
176. The United States annually sets aside a specified number of visas for the following
categories:
1. Unmarried sons and daughters of United States citizens and their
children, if any (23,400).
2. Spouses, minor children, and unmarried sons and daughters of lawful
permanent residents (114,200).
3. Married sons and daughters, and their spouses and children. (23,400).
4. Brothers and sisters of United States citizens, and their spouses and
children, provided the United States citizens are at least 21 years of age
(65,000).
INA § 203 (a)(1)-(4), 8 U.S.C § 1153(a)(1)-(4) (2006). There is no annual visa limit for United
States citizens who are petitioning for a spouse or unmarried children. There is also no limit
for United States citizens who are at least twenty one years of age who wish to bring their
parents. 8 U.S.C. § 1151.
177. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(2)(B).
178. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
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1. Resources
Appointing best interests representatives will require additional
resources, but it will not be extremely resource intensive because the best
interests representative will often be the parent. When the parent cannot
function as the child's best interests representative, the decision-maker
must appoint an appropriately trained individual. Appointing a best
interests representative may ultimately conserve resources: if a child's
claim is the strongest claim and results in a grant of protection for the child
and parent, the case may require fewer appeals, thus saving judicial
resources.
2. Role of the Immigration Decision-Maker
Following the Canadian model and allowing immigration decision-
makers to designate the best interests representative could result in
inadequate protection for children because an agency responsible for
interpreting federal immigration law does not have expertise in the area of
child protection. One response to this potential problem would be to
model the designation and requirements for the best interests
representative on state guardian ad litem systems. Adopting state
guardian ad litem systems could also be problematic, however, if it
resulted in fifty different approaches for federal immigration
proceedings.179
Following the Canadian approach and allowing the immigration
decision-maker to make the best interests determination for directly
affected children may result in determinations from decision-makers
lacking the necessary expertise. In addition to a lack of expertise there is a
real risk that, by allowing an immigration decision-maker to make a best
interests determination, the federal government would be encroaching
even further into a decision making area traditionally reserved to the
states.180 These concerns cannot be overstated, considering that Congress
chose not to vest the best interests determination with the immigration
decision-maker when developing SIJS relief.18 ' In addition to drawing on
179. A 1996 study by Jean Koh Peters found very little continuity in the theory or practice
of guardians ad litem across the country. See KOH PETERS, supra note 29, at 41 (finding that "in
many jurisdictions, if not all, it was reported that the practice of guardians ad litem and
attorneys for children varied wildly within the state, from locality to locality, from county to
county, even from courthouse to courthouse and lawyer to lawyer.").
180. See Thronson, supra note 11 (arguing that certain federal immigration decisions are
already functionally child custody determinations).
181. When implementing the SIJS relief, the INS acknowledged that the United States
immigration system does not have the expertise or the capacity to make "best interests of the
child" determinations. "[lt would be both impractical and inappropriate for the Service to
routinely readjudicate judicial or social service agency administrative determinations as to the
juvenile's best interest." Special Immigrant Status; Certain Aliens Declared Dependent on a
"Best Interests of the Child" and Immigration
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the strengths and capacities of each system, the SIJS model replicates the
traditional allocation of power between federal and state governments.
The federal government has long been acknowledged to have plenary
power over immigration matters 82 while state governments regulate
matters of family law.183  "The reliance upon state juvenile courts
anticipated in the SIJ[S] statutory scheme signals Congress' recognition that
the states retain primary responsibility and administrative competency to
protect child welfare." 184
While immigration decision-makers do not have the same expertise as
their counterparts in the child welfare system, they are not completely
unfamiliar with claims for relief based on the plight of a child. Indeed,
immigration decision-makers are familiar with parents' attempts to protect
their children by filing asylum claims or highlighting the plight of their
children to meet the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship"
requirement.1 85 Yet, unlike decision-makers in the child welfare context,
immigration judges do not typically realize when a child is at risk of abuse,
abandonment, neglect, or persecution when the parent is contributing to
those harms. It is essential to have a mechanism to evaluate the best
interests of the child in these types of cases, since "parental rights do not
include the right to either inflict harm upon a child or to place a child in a
position where he [or she] is likely to be harmed by others." 186 If a parent
does put a child at risk of harm, the state has a duty to protect the child.187
Juvenile Court, Final Rule, Supplementary Information, 58 Fed. Reg. 42,843, 42,847 (Aug. 12,
1993). The implementation of systems to protect child welfare has generally been left to the
states since "[t]he federal government's more limited regulatory role in child welfare has
resulted in comparatively less operation capacity in dealing with individual child welfare
cases." Gregory Zhong Tian Chen, Elian or Alien? The Contradiction of Protecting Undocumented
Children Under the Special Immigrant Juvenile Statue, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 597, 611 (2000).
182. See Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (stating that the power to deport is
"an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to its
safety, its independence and its welfare"); see also Kleindiest v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70
(1972) ("[Pllenary congressional power to make policies and rules for exclusion of aliens has
long been firmly established."); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531(1953):
Policies pertaining to the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are
peculiarly concerned with the political conduct of government ... that the
formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has
become about as firmly embedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of
our body politic as any aspect of our government[.]
183. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) ("The whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states and not to
the laws of the United States."); see also Thronson, supra note 11, at 456 ("Federal courts have
long been quick to invoke the 'domestic relations exception' that 'divests the federal courts of
power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees."') (citing Ankenbrandt v.
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)).
184. Chen, supra note 181, at 609.
185. See supra, Parts IlIi.B., D.
186. Melissa Leavister, Note, Ambiguity Equals Authority: The Immigration and
Naturalization Service's Response in the Elian Gonzalez Case, 31 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 219, 235
(2001).
187. Leavister, supra note 186, at 235.
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In addition, even assuming immigration decision-makers possessed the
same expertise and capacity as juvenile court judges, placing the best
interests determination outside of the immigration system would help to
insulate the determination from concerns related to immigration issues and
puts the focus on the protection of the child.
Despite the benefits of utilizing the child welfare expertise and
insulating the best interests determination from immigration issues, the
hybrid model of the SIJS approach is inapplicable to children who are
accompanied and directly affected by immigration proceedings.
Unaccompanied children have access to a best interests determination by
state courts because they are declared to be dependents of the state. Such a
declaration is inappropriate in the context of accompanied children and
any approach utilizing this model may seriously undermine the rights of
non-citizen parents to retain custody of their children. 88 While directly
affected children are not able to utilize the same mechanism for best
interests of the child determinations, when possible the expertise and
scholarly advances developed in the child advocacy system should be
incorporated into immigration regulations and procedures.'8 9
The risk of federal immigration law encroaching on state child welfare
law should diminish if a "best interests of the child" approach is
incorporated in immigration law and procedure. If an immigration
decision-maker is able to grant relief from removal based on the best
interests of the child, there will be fewer situations in which federal
immigration law behaves as child custody law.
3. Floodgates and Fraud
Immigration law and policy may be viewed as encouraging and
discouraging certain types of immigration. Allowing decision-makers to
grant relief to parents when their continued presence in the United States is
in the best interests of their children might create incentives for individuals
to come to the United States, have children, and then petition to remain in
the United States. 190 However, this argument is not supported by the
experience in Canada 91 or by the approach itself. A "best interests of the
188. Thronson, supra note 11, at 462 (highlighting the potential for discrimination and bias
on the basis of immigration status in child custody cases).
189. For example, the debate surrounding the uses and roles of guardians ad litem and
client-centered lawyer implicates many of the same concerns facing directly affected children
in immigration proceedings. See Koh Peters; Recommendations of the Conference; Report of the
Working Group, supra note 32.
190. In fact, the Seventh Circuit in Oforji v. Ashcroft highlighted this concern: "Under the
present law a woman who is otherwise a deportable alien does not have any incentive to bear
a child (who automatically becomes a citizen) whose rights to stay are separate from the
mother's obligation to depart." 354 F. 3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 2003).
191. Canada accepts a greater proportional share of immigrants to North America than
the United States. Immigration patterns to Canada have remained similar to those in the
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child" determination will not result in a free pass.192 Many determinations
may result in the conclusion that it is in the best interests of the child to
voluntarily depart with the parent.
In addition to the concerns about creating incentives for individuals to
come to the United States and have children in order to provide an avenue
for relief against deportation, another concern about the approaches
outlined here is the potential for fraud. "[R]efugees often lack documents
attesting to the veracity of their claims of a family relationship." 193
Compounding this issue is the lack of an international law treaty definition
of "family." 194  Different cultures and countries define "family"
differently.195  While these concerns are valid, they are not new.
Immigration decision-makers already decide what constitutes a family unit
and who possesses the correct documentation when adjudicating other visa
applications and forms of relief from removal. The immigration system in
the United States must grapple with potential fraud and documentation
requirements regardless of whether it incorporates a best interest of the
child standard.196 Such concerns cannot excuse the United States' failure to
protect directly affected accompanied children.
CONCLUSION
This Article identifies the ways the United States fails to protect both
foreign national and United States citizen children who are directly
United States despite Canada's use of the best interests of the child approach. See Boyd, supra
note 131 (noting the similar immigration patterns between the United States and Canada).
192. The jurisprudence developed in Canada around the best interests of the child
illustrates that this standard is not simply a prima facie presumption of granting relief to the
parent. See supra notes 148-150. The cancellation of removal context provides some evidence
of how a standard in which a child's interest may impact the parent's status would be
adjudicated. This is especially relevant in cases in which the decision-maker believes the
hardship analysis is equivalent to a best interests of the child standard. See Cabrera-Alvarez
v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that the hardship analysis for cancellation
of removal is consistent with a "best interests" analysis).
193. Kate Jastram and Kathleen Newland, Family Unity and Refugee Protection, in REFUGEE
PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 556, 558 (2003).
194. GERALDINE VAN BEUREN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 68
(1998).
195. Because of these differences, Article 5 of the CRC and the European Commission of
Human Rights don't focus on creating a finite definition of "family," but instead focus on
protecting "family life," which focuses on the substantive role of family members in relation
to children rather than family titles. This approach
is consistent with the best interests of the child as it allows a child to
maintain links with those relatives who have a substantive role to play in
his or her life, and it also gives locus standi to family members other than
the parents, enabling them to enforce their right to family life against the
state.
Id. at 70.
196. The immigration system must already deal with how to document and define family
members under current approaches. As examples, these issues could arise in family-based
visa petitions, T and U nonimmigrant visa derivative petitions, and asylum applications.
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affected by immigration proceedings. Directly affected children in
immigration proceedings are at risk of serious harm, including persecution
and torture, because of their invisibility and lack of access to protection.
These failures of protection are a direct result of the availability of a "best
interests of the child" determination to only a subset of children: those who
are unaccompanied by a parent. Currently, United States immigration law
utilizes a patchwork approach for identifying and protecting the interests
of children directly affected by immigration proceedings. This patchwork
approach is inconsistent with other domestic law, international law, and
the immigration law of other countries, such as Canada.
In order to transform its patchwork protection approach to a seamless
blanket of protection for all children, United States immigration law must
incorporate a "best interests of the child" determination. This best interests
approach must provide a voice to all children directly affected by
immigration proceedings. The child's safety, permanency, and well-being
must be part of the immigration decision-maker's analysis. Implementing
the procedural and statutory reforms outlined in this Article would
increase protection for all children directly affected by immigration
proceedings. Such reforms would also eliminate the split among the
federal circuit courts on the issue of whether the plight of a child may be a
factor in deciding a parent's claim for relief. More importantly, however,
incorporating the "best interests of the child" approach described in this
Article will provide effective protection to all children directly affected by
immigration proceedings, including children like Esther Olowo's
daughters.
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